We introduce a value for NTU games with coalition structure. This value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and with the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. Furthermore, we present two characterizations: the first one using a consistency property and the second one using balanced contributions' properties.
Introduction
Some of the most important issues of cooperative game theory are to define "good" values, to study which interesting properties are satisfied by these values, and to obtain axiomatic characterizations using some of these properties.
In cooperative games with transferable utility (T U games), Shapley (1953) introduces the Shapley value. He characterizes it as the only value satisfying efficiency, null player, symmetry, and additivity. Later, several authors obtain new characterizations of the Shapley value using other properties. For instance, Myerson (1980) characterizes the Shapley value using balanced contributions and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) characterize it by consistency.
There are several extensions of T U games. The most natural one is the extension to games without transferable utility (NT U games). Another extension The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation and some previous results. In Section 3 we define the consistent coalitional value. In Section 4 we study which properties are satisfied by this value. In Section 5 we present two axiomatic characterizations. Section 6 is devoted to some concluding remarks. Finally, in the Appendix, we present the proofs of the results obtained in the paper.
Definitions and Previous Results
Given a set A, |A| denotes the cardinal of A. Given x, y ∈ R N , we say y ≤ x when y i ≤ x i for each i ∈ N and x * y is the scalar product P i∈N x i y i . We denote R
We say that x ∈ R N is normalized if P i∈N max {x i , −x i } = 1. Given λ ∈ R N a vector orthogonal to some surface on R N , we say that λ is orthonormal if it is normalized. A game without transferable utility, or simply an NTU game, is a pair (N, V ) where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of players and V is a correspondence (characteristic function) which assigns to each coalition S ⊂ N a subset V (S) ⊂ R S . This subset represents all the possible payoffs that members of S can obtain for themselves when play cooperatively. For S ⊂ N , if there is no ambiguity, we maintain the notation V when refering to the application V restricted to S as player set. We also denote S = N\S.
Following Maschler and Owen (1992) we impose the next conditions on the function V :
(A1) For each S ⊂ N, the set V (S) is comprehensive (i.e., if x ∈ V (S) and y ∈ R S with y ≤ x, then y ∈ V (S)) and bounded above (i.e., for each x ∈ R S , the set {y ∈ V (S) : y ≥ x} is compact).
(A2) For each S ⊂ N , the boundary of V (S), which we denote by ∂V (S), is smooth (on each point of the boundary there exists an unique outward orthonormal vector) and nonlevel (the outward vector on each point of ∂V (S) has its coordinates positive). We denote these orthonormal vectors as λ S = ¡ λ (A5) For each S ⊂ N, the origin 0 S = (0, ..., 0) ∈ R S belongs to V (S).
Property (A5) is a normalization and does not affect our results.
We denote by NT U(N) the set of NT U games over N and by NT U the set of all NT U games.
We now introduce two particular subclasses of NT U games studied in this paper.
We say that (N, V ) is a game with transferable utility (or TU game) if there exists a function v : 2 N → R, called the characteristic function, satisfying v (∅) = 0 and for each S ⊂ N, V (S) = ½ x ∈ R S : P i∈S x i ≤ v(S) ¾ . Usually we represent a TU game as the pair (N, v) . We denote by T U (N) the set of T U games over N and by T U the set of all TU games. We say that (N, V ) is a hyperplane game if for all S ⊂ N there exists λ S ∈ R S ++ satisfying V (S) = © x ∈ R S : λ S * x ≤ v(S) ª (2.1) for some v : 2 N → R. Notice that each T U game is a hyperplane game (just take λ S i = 1 for each S ⊂ N and i ∈ S).
A coalition structure C over N is a partition of the player set, i.e., C = {C 1 , C 2 , ..., C m } ⊂ 2 N where S Cq∈C C q = N and C q ∩ C r = ∅ when q 6 = r. We denote by (N, V, C) an NT U game (N, V ) with coalition structure C over N. We denote CNT U (N) as the set of NT U games with coalition structure over N (CT U (N) for TU games) and by CNT U the set of all NT U games with coalition structure (CT U for TU games). Given S ⊂ N we denote by C S the structure C restricted to the players in S, i.e., C S = {C q ∩ S} Cq∈C . Notice that this implies that C S may have less or the same number of coalitions as C. For simplicity we use C −i instead of C N\{i} .
A payoff configuration for (N, V ) is a set of payoffs x = ¡ x S ¢ S⊂N with x S ∈ V (S) for all S ⊂ N.
Given G a subset of CN T U (or NT U), a value Γ on G is a correspondence which assigns to each (N,
When several NT U games or coalition structures are involved we write
is a single point of V (N ) for all (N, V, C) ∈ G we say that Γ is a single value. Of course each single value has a unique payoff configuration associated. Usually we write Γ N instead of Γ (N, V, C) .
We denote by φ N (or φ N (v)) the Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) of the T U game (N, v).
For T U games with coalition structure φ N (or φ N (v, C)) denotes the Owen value (Owen (1977) ), which is a generalization of the Shapley value (when C = {N} or C = © {i} i∈N ª , the Owen value coincides with the Shapley value). We now present the consistent value for NT U games following Owen (1989, 1992) .
Let Π be the set of all permutations over N. Given π ∈ Π, we define the set of predecessors of i under π as
We call the marginal contribution of player i ∈ N to the game V in the permutation π to
So, d i (π) is the maximum that player i can obtain in V (S) after his predecessors obtain their respective
Given a hyperplane game (N, V ), the consistent value Ψ N (or Ψ N (V )) (Maschler and Owen (1989) ) is the vector of expected marginal contributions, where each π ∈ Π is equally likely, i.e.
Notice that each d(π) is an efficient vector (it belongs to the boundary of V (N)). Since we are dealing with hyperplane games, this boundary is flat and the consistent value is also an efficient value. Maschler and Owen (1989) prove that, given i ∈ N,
One way to extend a hyperplane solution to the general class of NT U games with convex V (S)'s is to pass arbitrary hyperplanes to the various sets V (S) . These hyperplanes determine a hyperplane game to which we know the solution. If this solution belongs to V (N ) we say that this is a solution to the NT U game (N, V ) . This is the way adopted by Maschler and Owen (1992) for extending the consistent value to the class of NT U games.
Formally, given an NT U game (N, V ) we say that (N, V 0 ) is a supporting hyperplane game for (N, V ) if for each S ⊂ N ,
where λ S is orthonormal to the boundary of V (S) and v(S) = max
It is known that the consistent value is not a single value.
The Consistent Coalitional Value
In this section we define the consistent coalitional value for NT U games. We first define it in hyperplane games by generalizing the expression (2.2) of Ψ to situations with coalition structure.
Given a hyperplane game (N, V, C), the consistent coalitional value Υ N (or Υ N (V, C)) is the only vector satisfying the following two conditions:
For all i ∈ C q ∈ C,
Remark 1. It is straightforward to prove that Υ is well-defined and
Since Υ is a single value, there is only one consistent coalitional payoff con-
The generalization of Υ to NT U games is done analogously to the consistent value. For an NT U game with coalition structure (N, V, C), we take for each coalition S ⊂ N a orthonormal vector λ S to the boundary of V (S). Let (N, V 0 , C) be the resulting hyperplane game and let Υ = ¡ Υ S ¢ S⊂N be the consistent coalitional payoff configuration associated with (N, V 0 , C). If Υ S ∈ V (S) for all S ⊂ N, we say that Υ is a consistent coalitional payoff configuration.
In the next theorem we prove the existence of consistent coalitional payoff configurations.
Theorem 1: Every NT U game has a consistent coalitional payoff configuration.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If C = {N } or C = © {i} i∈N ª the consistent coalitional value Υ coincides with the consistent value Ψ. When C = {N}, (3.2) coincides with (2.2) and when C = © {i} i∈N ª , (3.1) coincides with (2.2) . Since Υ is the only value in hyperplane games satisfying (2.2) we conclude that Υ = Ψ. Now it is straightforward to conclude that Υ = Ψ in NT U games. Moreover, for T U games with coalition structure the consistent coalitional value coincides with the Owen value (we will see it later in Corollary 1). Thus, the consistent coalitional value is a generalization of the consistent value and the Owen value for NT U games with coalition structure.
We know that the Shapley value, the consistent value, and the Owen value are obtained as an average of marginal contributions depending on equal-likely permutations. Thus, it seems reasonable to generalize these values in the same way.
We say that a permutation π ∈ Π is admissible with respect to C if given i, j ∈ C q ∈ C and k ∈ N such that π(i) < π(k) < π(j) then k ∈ C q . We denote by Π C the set of all permutations over N admissible with respect to C. Given a hyperplane game (N, V, C), the random order coalitional value z N (or z N (V, C)) is defined as the vector of expected marginal contributions when all the admissible permutations with respect to C are equally likely, i.e.
We can extend, as in the case of the consistent coalitional value, the random order coalitional z to NT U games. Using arguments similar to those used with Υ we can prove that z is a single value in hyperplane games but not in general. Moreover, z also generalizes the consistent value and the Owen value.
In T U games McLean (1991) defines the random order coalitional structure values. z is the natural generalization to NT U games of McLean's values when all the admissible permutations are equal-likely and the rest of permutations have probability 0. It is remarkable that Maschler and Owen (1992) even suggest the name random order value instead of consistent value.
The definition of Υ is not so intuitive as the definition of z. Nevertheless, we believe that Υ is a more suitable value for hyperplane games (and NT U games) than z. We will prove later that Υ satisfies more interesting properties. Moreover, Υ can be characterized generalizing axiomatic characterizations of the Owen value and the consistent value.
We now compute Υ and z in the following example. Example 1. (Owen (1972) ). Let (N, V, C) be such that N = {1, 2, 3} and
and
If C = {{1, 2}, {3}}, we obtain that ¢ .
However, for C = {{1}, {2, 3}} both values coincide because
This example shows that Υ and z are different.
Properties
In this section we present several desirable properties and study which of them are satisfied by the consistent coalitional value. Some of these properties are well-known in the literature of NT U games. Others are introduced in this paper generalizing properties of T U games. We present the definitions for single values. The definition for payoff configurations associated with general values is straightforward.
We say that a value Γ satisfies efficiency (EF) if for each (N, V, C) ∈ CNT U, Γ N ∈ ∂V (N) .
Remark 2. Since V satisfies (A2) we conclude that if Γ satisfies efficiency then for each (N, V, C) ∈ CNT U and S ⊂ N, there exists λ
Of course, the reciprocal statement is also true.
Given (N, V, C) ∈ CNT U we say that two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric if two properties hold:
For each S ⊃ {i, j} , if x ∈ V (S), y i = x j , y j = x i , and x k = y k for each k ∈ S\ {i, j} then, y ∈ V (S).
We say that a value Γ satisfies individual symmetry (IS) if for each pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ C q ∈ C,
We now present the property of covariance in hyperplane games following Maschler and Owen (1989) . Let (N, V, C) and (N, e V , C) be two hyperplane games such that for each S ⊂ N,
We say that (N, V, C) and (N, e V , C) are equivalent under a linear transformation of player i's utility if there exist two constants a ∈ R ++ and b ∈ R such that for all S ⊂ N : e λ
C´are equivalent under a linear transformation of player i's utility, then e x ∈ V (S) if and only if there exists x ∈ V (S) satisfying: e x i = ax i + b and e x j = x j if j ∈ S \ {i}. We say that a value Γ satisfies covariance ( COV) if, given two hyperplane games (N, V, C) and (N, e V , C), equivalent under a linear transformation of some player i's utility,
Thus, covariance just states that, if we linearly change player i's utility function, his final payoff changes the same way, while other players' payoffs remain constant. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) characterize the Shapley value as the only value on T U games satisfying consistency and other properties. They say that a value Γ satisfies consistency (CONS) if and only if for each (N, v) ∈ T U, S ⊂ N, and Winter (1992) extends the definition of consistency to T U games with coalition structure. He say that a value Γ satisfies consistency (CONS) if and only if for each (N, v, C) ∈ CT U, C q ∈ C, S ⊂ C q , and i ∈ S,
tency is a generalization of Hart and Mas-Colell's consistency to T U games with coalition structure. Maschler and Owen (1989) show that if we define the property of consistency of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) in NT U games as in the T U case, there is no value satisfying consistency and other "basic" properties (for instance, efficiency). Thus they provide a weaker definition of consistency for hyperplane games.
They say that a value Γ satisfies l-consistency if for each hyperplane game (N, V, C) with l ≤ |N | and i ∈ N, X S⊂N,i∈S,|S|=l
where
We now present a generalization to hyperplane games with coalition structure.
Given a value Γ, a hyperplane game (N, V, C) , and S ⊂ C q ∈ C, the reduced game (S, V S , {S}) is defined for each T ⊂ S as follows:
It is straightforward to prove that V S is the hyperplane game given, for each T ⊂ S, by
We say that a value Γ satisfies l-consistency if for each hyperplane game (N, V, C), C q ∈ C with l ≤ |C q | , and i ∈ C q , X S⊂Cq,i∈S,|S|=l
For simplicity we denote
We call 2-consistency bilateral consistency ( BCONS).
Notice that our bilateral consistency generalizes, in the natural way, the consistency of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) , the consistency of Winter (1992) , and the bilateral consistency of Maschler and Owen (1989) . Myerson (1980) characterizes the Shapley value using efficiency and balanced contributions. He say that a value Γ satisfies balanced contributions (BC) if for each (N, v) ∈ T U and i, j ∈ N, Calvo et al. (1996) generalize the property of balanced contributions for T U games with a coalition structure obtaining two properties: BCAC and BCAP 1 . They say that a value Γ satisfies balanced contributions among coalitions (BCAC) if for each (N, v, C) ∈ CT U and C q , C r ∈ C with q 6 = r,
They say that a value Γ satisfies balanced contributions among players in the same coalition (BCAP) if for each i, j ∈ C q ∈ C with i 6 = j, Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) introduce the following generalization of balanced contributions for NT U games.
They say that a value Γ satisfies average balanced contributions (ABC) if for each (N, V ) ∈ NT U, S ⊂ N, and i ∈ S, there exists λ
We now introduce the properties of average balanced contributions among coalitions and average balanced contributions among players in the same coalition for NT U games with coalition structure.
We say that a value Γ satisfies average balanced contributions among coalitions ( ABCAC) if for each (N, V, C) ∈ CNT U, S ⊂ N, and
We say that a value Γ satisfies average balanced contributions among players in the same coalition
Notice that our average balanced contributions properties generalize, in the natural way, the balanced properties of Myerson (1980) , Calvo et al. (1996) , and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) .
Before studying the properties satisfied by the consistent coalitional value we need a previous result.
Lemma 1. Given a hyperplane game (N, V, C) and i ∈ S ⊂ C q ∈ C,
Proof. This result is due to Maschler and Owen (1989) . ¥ and Owen (1989) prove that Ψ satisfies, in hyperplane games, lconsistency for all l = 1, ..., n. In the next proposition we obtain a similar result for Υ.
Maschler
Proposition 1. The consistent coalitional value satisfies, in hyperplane games, l-consistency for each l with 1 ≤ l ≤ n.
In the next theorem we study which of these properties are satisfied by the consistent coalitional value.
Theorem 2. The consistent coalitional value satisfies EF , IS, ABCAC, and ABCAP . Moreover, in hyperplane games it also satisfies COV and BCON S.
By Theorem 2 we know that Υ satisfies, in NT U games or hyperplane games, all the interesting properties that the Owen value satisfies in TU games and the consistent coalitional value in NT U games or hyperplane games.
Axiomatic characterizations
In this section we present two axiomatic characterizations of the consistent coalitional value. The first one applies to the set of hyperplane games; and we present it by using consistency. The second one applies to the set of NT U games; and we present it by using balanced contributions. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) characterize the Shapley value on the class of T U games as the only single value satisfying EF, SY M (symmetry), COV, and CONS. Later, Winter (1992) and Maschler and Owen (1989) extend this result in two different ways. Winter (1992) extends it to the class of T U games with coalition structure. He proves that the Owen value is the only single value satisfying EF, IS, COV, CONS, and Game Between Coalitions Property (GBCP ).
They say that a single value Γ satisfies GBCP if for each T U game (N, v, C) and
This property says that the amount received by a coalition in the game played by the coalitions (every coalition acts as a single player) coincides with the sum of the amounts received by the members of this coalition in the original game. This property cannot be exported to hyperplane games. It is not difficult to check that the proof of Winter's result about the characterization of the Owen value is also valid if we replace GBCP by BCAC. Then, the Owen value is the only single value satisfying EF, IS, COV, CON S, and BCAC. Maschler and Owen (1989) extend this result to the class of hyperplane games. They prove that the consistent value is the only single value satisfying EF, SY M, COV, and BCON S.
In Theorem 3 below we generalize the results of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) , Winter (1992) , and Maschler and Owen (1989) to hyperplane games with coalition structure.
Theorem 3: The consistent coalitional value is the only single value on the class of hyperplane games satisfying EF, IS, COV, BCONS, and ABCAC.
Remark 3. The properties used in this theorem are independent (see the Appendix). Myerson (1980) characterizes the Shapley value on the class of T U games as the only single value satisfying EF and BC. Later, Calvo et al. (1996) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) extend this result in two different ways. Calvo et al. (1996) extend it to the class of T U games with coalition structure. They prove that the Owen value is the only single value satisfying EF, BCAP, and BCAC.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) extend Myerson's result to the class of NT U games proving that the consistent value is the only value satisfying EF and ABC.
In Theorem 4 below we generalize the results of Myerson (1980) , Calvo et al. (1996) , and Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) to NT U games with coalition structure.
Theorem 4. The consistent coalitional value is the only value on the class of NT U games with coalition structure satisfying EF, ABCAC, and ABCAP.
Remark 4. The properties used in this theorem are independent (see the Appendix).
We now prove that the consistent coalitional value generalizes the Owen value.
Corollary 1: For each T U game (N, v, C) the Owen value is the only consistent coalitional value.
The results obtained in this section about the consistent coalitional value and the relation with other values can be summarized in the following table. Then, the consistent coalitional value is the right generalization of the Owen value and the consistent value to NT U games with coalition structure if we focus on the properties of consistency and balanced contributions of both values.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we present two generalizations of the Owen value and the consistent value for NT U games with coalition structure: the consistent coalitional value and the random order coalitional value.
We now study which of the properties introduced before are satisfied by the random order coalitional value. In the following lemma we prove that the random order coalitional value also satisfies (3.1) .
Lemma 2. z satisfies (3.1) in the class of hyperplane games.
Since z and Υ are different (Example 1) we conclude that z does not satisfy (3.2) .
Proposition 2. a) The random order coalitional value satisfies EF , IS, COV (in hyperplane games), and ABCAC.
b) The random order coalitional value satisfy neither BCONS nor ABCAP. Proof. a) It is trivial to see that z satisfies EF and IS. Maschler and Owen (1989) show that, for any π ∈ Π, the vector d(π) satisfies COV . Since z is the mean of some of these d(π)'s, we conclude that z also satisfies COV .
By Lemma 2, z satisfies (3.1) . Now, using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 2 for Υ, we can conclude that z also satisfies ABCAC.
b) It is as a consequence of theorems 3 and 4. ¥
In T U games, NT U games, and T U games with coalition structure the Shapley value, the consistent value, and the Owen value have two important aspects. Firstly, they have an intuitive definition because they can be computed through the vector of marginal contributions. Secondly, these values can be characterized with nice properties (namely, consistency and balanced contributions).
NT U games with coalition structure generalize the three class of games mentioned before. Nevertheless, in this general framework we can not find a value with an intuitive definition and nice characterizations. The random order coalitional value has an intuitive definition through the vector of marginal contributions but fails in the nice characterizations. The consistent coalitional value has nice characterizations but fails in the intuitive definition.
This fact is not surprising. There are results from T U games that can not be generalized in the same way to NT U games. For instance, the consistent value and the Shapley NT U value are generalizations of the Shapley value. But, whereas the consistent value generalizes the characerizations of the Shapley value based in the properties of consistency and balanced contributions, Aumann (1985) proves that the Shapley NT U value generalizes the classical axiomatization of the Shapley value.
NT U games with coalition structure are studied also by Winter (1991) , where he characterizes the Game Coalition Structure Value. This value is a generalization of both, the Harsanyi value for NT U games and the Owen value for T U games with coalition structure. Winter characterizes his value with six axioms: EF, COV, conditional additivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, inessential games, and unanimity games. We believe that the properties used in the characterizations of Υ are more natural than the properties used by Winter. For instance, unanimity games says that the value must coincide with the Owen value in unanimity games.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The structure of the proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.3 in Maschler and Owen (1992) , where they prove the existence of the consistent value for general NT U games.
We make use of induction to prove the following claim:
is a consistent coalitional payoff configuration of the game (S, V, C S ), there exists
is a consistent coalitional payoff configuration of (N, V, C).
For n = 1 the claim is trivially true, the collection being the empty set. Assume now the claim holds for less than n players. Thus, there exists a collection
is a consistent coalitional payoff configuration of the game (S, V, C S ).
Assume that z ∈ ∂V (N ).
is the orthonormal vector outwards z.
Consider the hyperplane game (N, V z , C) such that, for each S ⊂ N,
be the (unique) consistent coalitional payoff configuration for the hyperplane game (N,
We want to show that there exists a point x N ∈ ∂V (N ) such that the collection
is a consistent coalitional payoff configuration for (N, V, C). Notice that it is enough to prove that Υ
We make use of a fixed point theorem.
Since Υ satisfies (3.1) and (3.2) and the λ S i 's are strictly positive and continuous functions, Υ N (z) is also a continuous function of z.
We define M = max
, where δ is given by (A4).
Given C q ∈ C, by (3.1),
By (A5), v (N ) ≥ 0, and since the λ N j 's are positive,
where the last inequality comes because λ N is normalized.
Given i ∈ C q ∈ C, by (3.2),
N is normalized, and δ < 1,
. The rest of the proof is analogous to Maschler and Owen's (1992) and we just give a geometric description for the case n = 2.
Figure 1
We define D = © x ∈ R N : x i ≥ −2M for all i ∈ N ª . Given a vector z on ∂V (N ) ∩ D (which is the thick line in figure 1) , we have proved that Υ N (z) ∈ D; and so the point F (z) obtained by applying a projection centered at σ = (−2M, ..., −2M) ∈ R N , also belongs to ∂V (N ) ∩ D (see figure 1) . By applying a standard fixed point theorem over the (continuous) function F , we find the desired x N . ¥ Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed by induction on l. The theorem is trivially true for l = 1. Assume it is true for at most l − 1.
If we apply the induction hypothesis to the game (N \ {j} , V, C −j ) with j ∈ C q \ {i} (if C q = {i}, the result is trivially true for C q ) then, P T ⊂Cq\{j}:i∈T,|T |=l−1
We wish to prove that for each C q ∈ C and i ∈ C q , lλ N i P S⊂Cq:i∈S,|S|=l
To do so, we analyze the left side of this expression. Assume that i ∈ S ⊂ C q and |S| = l. Applying (3.2) to (S, V S , {S}), which is also a hyperplane game, we obtain:
If we compute Υ in the game V S we obtain that
Hence,
Since there are ¡ |Cq|−1 l−1 ¢ possible sets S ⊂ C q with i ∈ S and |S| = l,
Rearranging the order of summation, we have:
We now analyze the four terms separately:
1. First term is equal, by Lemma 1, to
which coincides, by (7.1), with µ
Third term is equal to
∈ S, and |S| = l; and for each j ∈ N \C q , there are ¡ |Cq|−1 l−1 ¢ possible sets S, such that S ⊂ C q , i ∈ S, j / ∈ S, and |S| = l, last expression coincides with
4. Fourth term is equal, by Lemma 1, to
which coincides, by (7.1), with
, adding terms 2 and 3 we obtain µ
In Theorem 2 we prove, without using this lemma, that Υ satisfies ABCAP and hence,
¢ , the last expression coincides with
which is precisely the right side of (7.2). ¥ Proof of Theorem 2. It is straightforward to prove that Υ satisfies EF and IS. By Proposition 1, we know that Υ satisfies BCONS.
be a consistent coalitional payoff configuration. Then, there exists a supporting hyperplane game (N,
++ is an orthonormal vector to ∂V (S) and v(S) = max © λ S * x : x ∈ V (S) ª . We now prove that Υ satisfies ABCAC. In order to simplify the notation, we assume that S = N. By EF and Remark 2, v(N) = P
. Applying this to (3.1) we obtain that for all C q ∈ C,
If we subtract P
which means that Υ satisfies ABCAC.
We now prove that Υ satisfies ABCAP. In order to simplify the notation, we assume that S = N. Given i ∈ C q ∈ C, by (3.2),
which means that Υ satisfies ABCAP.
We now prove that Υ satisfies COV. Given i ∈ C q ∈ C, let ³ N, e V , C´be obtained from (N, V, C) by a change in player i's utility. Let a and b be the corresponding constants. We proceed by induction over the number of coalitions of C.
If C has only one coalition (C = {N}) and since Ψ satisfies COV :
Assume the result holds when |C| has at most m − 1 coalitions. We prove it when |C| = m.
By induction hypothesis, Υ
where the last equality comes because Υ satisfies (3.1) . Given k ∈ C q , by (3.2) ,
By the induction hypothesis and the previous result, if k = i then,
where the last equality comes because Υ satisfies (3.2) . Therefore,
By the induction hypothesis and the previous result, if k 6 = i then,
. Given C r ∈ C \ C q , using arguments similar to those used for C q we can conclude that
Thus, Υ satisfies COV. ¥ Proof of Theorem 3. In Theorem 2 we proved that the consistent coalitional value satisfies these five properties in the class of hyperplane games.
We now prove the reciprocal. Let e Υ be a single value satisfying these five properties. We will show that e Υ = Υ. We proceed by induction on the number of players. If there is only one player, then, by EF, e Υ = max {x : x ∈ V ({i})} = Υ. When |N| = 2 we can assume without loss of generality that λ {i} i = λ {j} j = 1. There are two possible coalition structures,
Since e Υ satisfies EF and IS, we conclude that
Since e Υ satisfies EF and ABCAC, we conclude that
A similar result can be obtained for Υ.
Since any hyperplane game with two players (N, V, C) can be obtained from v a (for some a) by linear transformation of utilities of players, and Υ and e Υ satisfy COV it is straightforward to prove that for each i ∈ N,
Assume that e Υ = Υ for hyperplane games with at most n − 1 players with n ≥ 3. We prove e Υ = Υ when (N, V, C) is a hyperplane game with n players. We first prove that for each C q ∈ C,
By induction hypothesis we know that, for each
We add and subtract P
Since e Υ satisfies ABCAC, we conclude that the last expression is equal to 0.
We now prove that e Υ
We denote by V S and e V S the reduced games associated to Υ and e Υ respectively. By (7.4) , if C q = {i} we conclude that e Υ N i = Υ N i . Assume that C q 6 = {i} . For each j ∈ C q \ {i} we consider S = {i, j}. We know that V S and e V S are hyperplane games. We denote by v S andṽ S the associated functions to V S and e V S . By the definition of reduced game and the induction hypothesis, e V S ({i}) = V S ({i}) and e V S ({j}) = V S ({j}) .
Hence, v S ({i}) =ṽ S ({i}) and v S ({j}) =ṽ S ({j}) .
Since e Υ satisfies EF we conclude that
By the efficiency of e Υ and (7.3),
If we sum on C q \ {i} both expressions,
Since e Υ satisfies BCONS, P
A similar analysis for Υ yields,
By (7.4),
Adding (7.5) and (7.6),
Proof of Remark 3. ABCAC is independent of the rest of properties because the consistent value satisfies EF , IS, COV, and BCON S but not ABCAC.
Using arguments similar to those used by Winter (1992) , we can conclude that the rest of properties are independent. ¥ Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 2, we know that Υ satisfies these properties.
We now prove the reciprocal. We proceed by induction on the number of players. The result is trivially true for n = 1. Assume the result holds for each S Ã N.
Assume now
is a payoff configuration associated to a valueΥ satisfying these properties. By Remark 2 and EF , for each S ⊂ N there exists
0 , C) be the corresponding hyperplane game, i.e. for each S ⊂ N,
It is enough to prove thatΥ
. Assume that i ∈ C q ∈ C. SinceΥ satisfies EF and ABCAC, using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 3, we can conclude that for each
By (3.2),
j and the induction hypothesis,
if we add and substract
, we obtain:
Then,
SinceΥ satisfies ABCAP, we conclude that the last expression is equal to 0. ABCAP is independent of the rest of properties. The random order coalitional value satisfies EF and ABCAC but not ABCAP.
ABCAC is independent of the rest of properties. Given a hyperplane game (N, V, C) we define, for each i ∈ N,
Let π ∈ Π q be a permutation of players in C q . We consider f (π) ∈ R Cq such that for each i ∈ C q ,
It is straightforward to prove that
Then, given i ∈ C q ∈ C, we define Γ as follows:
For each C q ∈ C and π ∈ Π q , since Ω satisfies EF, P
Then, it is trivial to see that Γ satisfies EF in the class of hyperplane games.
We now prove that Γ satisfies ABCAP. For each j ∈ C q we denote the set of permutations of Π q where j is the last player by Π q (j). If j 6 = i, then player i's expected marginal contribution conditioned to j being last, is the same as in the game (N \ {j} , V, C −j ), which is Γ N\{j} i , i.e. Thus, for each i ∈ C q ∈ C,
Since |Π q | = |C q | |Π q (j)| for each j ∈ C q , the last expression can be rewritten as If we proceed with Γ in the same way that we did with Υ we can extend Γ to the set of NT U games and prove that Γ also satisfies EF and ABCAP in the class of NT U games. Of course, Γ 6 = Υ. ¥ Proof of Corollary 1: Since each T U game is a hyperplane game, we conclude that the consistent coalitional value is a single value. Repeating the same arguments that in the proof of Theorem 4 for T U games we can obtain that there is at most a value (on the set of T U games) satisfying EF, ABCAC, and ABCAP. Then, we only need to prove that the Owen value φ satisfies these properties.
We know that φ satisfies EF. We now prove that φ satisfies ABCAC and ABCAP . By simplicity we assume that S = N.
Since φ satisfies BCAC, for each C q , C r ∈ C X be the random order coalitional payoff configuration for (N, V, C). By definition, z N j is the expected marginal contribution of player j over all the |Π C | admissible permutations of players with respect to C. We classify these permutations in |C| groups according the last coalition C r in such permutations.
Let Π C (C r ) be the set of admissible permutations with respect to C in which players of coalition C r are in the last position. Notice that |Π C | = |C||Π C (C r )| for each C r ∈ C.
If C r 6 = C p , then the expected marginal contribution for each player j ∈ C p in the permutations of Π C (C r ) coincides with the expected marginal contribution of player j in the game (N\C r , V, C\C r ), which is z (7.7)
Moreover, for each π ∈ Π C (C q ), 
